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Abstract
Traffic scenarios are inherently interactive. Multi-
ple decision-makers predict the actions of others
and choose strategies that maximize their rewards.
We view these interactions from the perspective
of game theory which introduces various chal-
lenges. Humans are not entirely rational, their
rewards need to be inferred from real-world data,
and any prediction algorithm needs to be real-time
capable so that we can use it in an autonomous
vehicle (AV). In this work, we present a game-
theoretic method that addresses all of the points
above. Compared to many existing methods used
for AVs, our approach does 1) not require perfect
communication, and 2) allows for individual re-
wards per agent. Our experiments demonstrate
that these more realistic assumptions lead to qual-
itatively and quantitatively different reward infer-
ence and prediction of future actions that match
better with expected real-world behaviour.
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most pressing problems that need to be solved to
realize autonomous driving in urban environments is the in-
teraction with vulnerable road users such as pedestrians and
cyclists. Merely extrapolating the current velocity vector of
a pedestrian fails to account for behavioural changes caused
by interactions with traffic participants and the environmen-
tal layout (traffic lights, zebra crossings, obstacles). Existing
work (Kretzschmar et al., 2016; Pfeiffer et al., 2016; Sadigh
et al., 2018; Schwarting et al., 2019a; Ma et al., 2017) in the
domain of intelligent vehicles may describe these kinds of
social interactions in terms of Markov Decision Processes
(MDP), i.e. a framework where each agent (human) is max-
imizing a reward (avoid collision, be considerate). Three
aspects are crucial when using MDPs to model human inter-
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actions. One is inferring the correct reward function from
real-world data, another is to account for bounded rational-
ity, and finally, we want real-time predictions given a reward
function.
Reward Inference: One way of inferring rewards from
multi-agent data is to fix the observed actions of the other
agents, i.e. decoupling the actions from the other agents
from one’s own (Schwarting et al., 2019a; Sadigh et al.,
2018). Treating other agents as dynamic obstacles reduces
the problem to that of a single agent. Another approach
is to assume that all agents are controlled by one ”brain”
(Kretzschmar et al., 2016; Pfeiffer et al., 2016). Therefore,
communication between agents is instant, and they may
coordinate their actions perfectly. Additionally, all agents
optimize the same (cooperative) reward function. While this
assumption simplifies computations, it represents an overly
altruistic view of the world.
Bounded Rationality: Humans are boundedly rational
(Wright & Leyton-Brown, 2010). Instead of executing an
action that leads to the highest expected reward, humans
may choose another action that rewards less. In other words,
the probability of selecting an action increases with the
expected reward of that action. Humans do not follow deter-
ministic paths in traffic scenarios. Instead, they show natural
variation in their decision making. (Schwarting et al., 2019a;
Fridovich-Keil et al., 2019a; Sadigh et al., 2018) argue from
the deterministic perspective that agents maximize their ex-
pected reward as much as possible. We aim for a prediction
algorithm that takes bounded rationality into account.
Another term that relates to the same concept is probability
matching. (Eysenbach & Levine, 2019) discusses probabil-
ity matching in maximum-entropy reinforcement learning
and the connection to human and animal decision making.
Also, we may refer to the behaviour of an agent as sub-
optimal, meaning the same concept.
Operational Constraints: A prediction algorithm should
be capable of running efficiently (preferably in real-time)
and work in continuous action and state spaces. (Fridovich-
Keil et al., 2019a) demonstrate a multi-agent algorithm that
is real-time capable. The underlying reason for the effi-
ciency is that the algorithm belongs to the family of linear
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quadratic regulator (LQR) methods.
Contributions: In this work, we address the challenges
outlined above. We present a novel algorithm that
• learns the reward functions of a diverse set of agents. It
does not assume the other agents as dynamic obstacles,
and it does not assume instant communication between
agents.
• accounts for variation in the decisions of an agent be-
cause it belongs to the family of maximum-entropy
algorithms.
• can be adapted for prediction tasks, with the potential
of running in real-time as it is related to LQR methods.
In particular,
• we extend the continuous inverse optimal control
(CIOC) (Levine & Koltun, 2012) algorithm to the
general-sum two-agent setting
• we verify the algorithm on simulations and show its
usefulness. In particular, our algorithm allows us to
choose different reward functions for each agent. Ad-
ditionally, we observe a significant difference in the
deduced reward and predictions when not assuming
instant communication.
2. Related Work
We focus on work that deals with traffic interactions in-
volving pedestrians, or that could be easily applied to such
interactions. For a comprehensive overview of the literature
on predicting the intentions of pedestrians see (Rudenko
et al., 2019). We focus on the multi-agent generalizations of
Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) where the agent (e.g.
pedestrian) executes actions (step to the right) to maximize
a reward (avoid collision). A useful extension of the stan-
dard MDP framework to the maximum-entropy framework
can describe boundedly rational behaviour of humans more
closely (see e.g. (Kitani et al., 2012)).
In the following sub-sections, we outline other work close
to ours, considering (real-time) multi-agent games in con-
tinuous action and state spaces that model interactions of
robots (or humans) with humans in traffic like scenarios.
Multi-Agent Games: (Sadigh et al., 2018; Schwarting
et al., 2019a) consider so-called Stackelberg games between
cars in continuous state and action spaces where the agents
take turns and communicate their actions to the other agents
before executing them. This simplifies the computational
complexity of the problem significantly since it is sequen-
tial and deterministic in nature. Both publications infer the
reward functions from real-world data using CIOC (Levine
& Koltun, 2012). Though, other agents are reduced to dy-
namic obstacles simplifying the reward inference (i.e. non
reacting).
The approaches of (Schwarting et al., 2019b; Fridovich-Keil
et al., 2019b;a) are inspired by the iLQG algorithm and the
well-established solutions to linear quadratic games (see for
example (Basar & Olsder, 1999)). They can deal with non-
linear dynamics and non-linear cost functions in multi-agent
dynamic games. In contrast to our work, (Fridovich-Keil
et al., 2019b;a; Schwarting et al., 2019b) do not consider
boundedly rational agents and reward inference.
Bounded Rationality: The notion of bounded rationality
has a long tradition in both artificial intelligence (Simon,
1955; Russell, 1997; Zilberstein, 2011; Rubinstein, 1986;
Halpern et al., 2014) and (behavioral) game theory (McK-
elvey & Palfrey, 1995; Rubinstein, 1998; Wright & Leyton-
Brown, 2010). In particular, we will use a model of bounded
rationality that is very close to the quantal response equilib-
rium (McKelvey & Palfrey, 1995). Our contribution here
can be seen as the ability to approximate such a QRE, in
continuous games, while also inferring the rewards from
data.
Maximum Entropy Inverse Reinforcement Learning:
Also, in the context of RL, people have considered notions
of boundedly rational agents. (Ziebart et al., 2008) intro-
duced maximum-entropy inverse reinforcement learning
(MaxEntIRL) to obtain the rewards from agents that act
boundedly rational. The most daunting task in MaxEntIRL
for high dimensional continuous action and state spaces
(i.e. no dynamic programming) is the derivation of the
partition function Z =
∫
p(τ) exp(r(τ)). (Kuderer et al.,
2013) approximate the distribution over trajectories with
weighted sums of delta-functions representing the observed
data points, optimizing the data likelihood by gradient as-
cent. A more advanced algorithm - which we will use in
this paper - is the use of the Laplace approximation (second-
order Taylor expansion) around the observed data points
that models the curvature of the reward function (Levine &
Koltun, 2012; Dragan & Srinivasa, 2013). Another possibil-
ity is a sampling-based approximation by, e.g. Monte Carlo
methods (Kretzschmar et al., 2016; Pfeiffer et al., 2016;
Xu et al., 2019). In general, this corresponds to solving
the full reinforcement learning problem in an inner loop of
the inverse reinforcement learning algorithm (Finn et al.,
2016).
3. BACKGROUND
We are considering a two-agent stochastic game with shared
states xt, agent specific actions uit, ujt (i,j - agent index),
agent specific rewards ri(xt, uit, ujt) and stochastic transi-
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tions p(xt|uit, ujt, xt−1) to the xt given the actions ukt and
state xt−1. In general, both the transitions and the reward
function depend on the actions of both agents1.
Also, the rewards of the agents are discounted with a dis-
count factor γ. In the following, we give an overview of the
most important formulas for the single-agent case. These
will translate to the two-agent setting naturally.
Given a state xt−1 at time-step t − 1 and an action ut,
an agent will transition to the next state according to the
stochastic environment transitions p(xt|xt−1, ut).2 The
agent will also receive a reward r(xt, ut) depending on the
action ut and the state xt that the environment (including the
agent) transitions to. In this work, we assume that an agent
does not act fully rational and chooses sub-optimal actions.
A natural description of this type of bounded rationality is
the maximum-entropy (MaxEnt) framework (Ziebart et al.,
2008) which can be used to describe the sub-optimal deci-
sions of humans (e.g. (Kitani et al., 2012)). In the MaxEnt
framework, a trajectory is sampled from a probability distri-
bution given by
p(τ) = Πtp(xt|xt−1, ut) exp(r(xt, ut)) (1)
with the trajectory τ corresponding to the sequence of ac-
tions ut and states xt over multiple time-steps t. The policy
pi(ut|xt−1) of an agent, i.e. the conditional pdf that de-
scribes the most likely actions ut that an agent takes given
its current state xt−1 depends on the Q-function
pi(ut|xt−1) = exp(Q(xt−1, ut))∫
exp(Q(xt−1, u′t)du′t)
(2)
The Q-function may be derived by performing dynamic
programming, iterating over the soft-Bellman equation until
convergence.
Q(xt−1, ut) =
∫
p(x′t|ut, xt−1)
(
r(x′t, ut)+
γ log
∫
exp(Q(x′t, u
′
t+1))du
′
t+1
)
dx′t (3)
The second term inside the first integral is the value function.
V (xt) = log
∫
exp(Q(xt, u
′
t+1))du
′
t+1 (4)
The reason we refer to (3) as the soft-Bellman equation
is the soft-maximization operator log
∫
exp. In contrast,
the standard Bellman equation employs the ”hard” maxi-
mization operator max. A connection can be established
by scaling the reward function and considering the limit
1A fully cooperative reward is an example where agent i may
receive a reward for an action that agent j executes.
2We follow the notation by (Levine & Koltun, 2012) in which
the action is indexed with the stage to which it takes us.
of limα→+∞(αr) which will recover the ”hard” maximiza-
tion in the soft-Bellman equation and a policy that satisfies
the standard Bellman equation given the unscaled reward
function. Please refer to the excellent tutorial on maximum-
entropy reinforcement learning and its connection to proba-
bilistic inference (Levine, 2018) for a thorough derivation
of the soft-Bellman equation and its connection to (1).
In the following sections, we will only consider finite hori-
zon problems, i.e. each agent will collect rewards for a
limited amount of time. Additionally, we set the discount
factor to γ = 1.
4. General-Sum Multi-Agent Continuous
Inverse Optimal Control
We extend CIOC to the two-agent3 setting where each agent
may receive a different reward. A major difference to the
derivation of CIOC is the environment transitions that are
not deterministic anymore. We assume that the other agent
is part of the environment and acts according to a stochastic
policy. The iterative nature of the algorithm bears a resem-
blance to (Nair et al., 2003), though, we update the policies
in parallel (not alternating) while also being able to handle
continuous states and actions. A major advantage of CIOC
and its extension is the relative ease of inferring the reward
parameters from demonstrations. We can backpropagate the
gradients directly through the policy, eliminating the need to
run a complex deep reinforcement learning algorithm every
time we update the reward parameters.
We will present three algorithms that are interconnected.
General-Sum Multi-Agent Continuous Inverse Optimal
Control (GS-CIOC) (algorithm 1) that returns policies for
quadratic rewards and linear environment transitions. For
non-quadratic rewards and non-linear transitions, Iterative
GS-CIOC can be used (algorithm 2) to obtain locally op-
timal policies. It uses GS-CIOC as a sub-routine. Finally,
the reward inference algorithm 3 uses GS-CIOC for obtain-
ing local policy approximations around observed real-world
data for any type of reward functions and transitions.
Two-Agent Soft-Bellman Equation
We assume that all agents choose their actions in accordance
with (1) which directly raises the question how they deal
with the presence of other agents. Here, the other agent
is part of the environment, similar to the multi-agent set-
ting in interacting Partially Observable Markov Decision
Processes (POMDPs) as described by (Gmytrasiewicz &
Doshi, 2005). Let uit, ujt be the actions of agent i and
j respectively. We assume the environment transitions to
be deterministic, i.e. p(xt|xt−1, uit, ujt) is a determinis-
3Extension to N agents is discussed in supplementary material.
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tic function. The reward function of agent i may depend
on the action of agent j, i.e. ri(xt, uit, ujt), though ujt
is not known to agent i at t − 1. Therefore, for argu-
ment’s sake, we define a new state variable x˜t = [xt, ujt]
and the corresponding stochastic environment transitions
p(x˜t|x˜t−1, uit) := p(xt, ujt|xt−1, ujt−1, uit). The soft-
Bellman equation for agent i is as follows
Qi(x˜t−1, uit) =
∫
p(x˜t|x˜t−1, uit)
(
ri(x˜t, uit)
+ γ log
∫
exp(Qi(x˜t, uit+1))duit+1
)
dx˜t (5)
The agent decides on its action based on xt, not x˜t. Thus,
we can drop the x˜t dependency in the Q-function. Also, we
can expand the environment transitions p(x˜t|x˜t−1, uit) =
p(xt|xt−1, uit, ujt)pij(ujt|xt−1), with pij being the policy
of agent j. The soft-Bellman equation can now be reformu-
lated as
Qi(xt−1, uit) =∫
p(xt|xt−1, uit, ujt)pij(ujt|xt−1)
(
ri(xt, uit, ujt)
+ γ log
∫
exp(Qi(xt, uit+1))duit+1
)
dujtdxt (6)
Solving the Bellman-equation for high-dimensional con-
tinuous state and action spaces is in general intractable.
Tackling this problem employs many researchers in the
fields of reinforcement learning and optimal control. Here,
we make use of the so-called Laplace approximation that
deals with the difficulty of calculating the partition func-
tion
∫
Πtp(xt|xt−1, ut) exp(r(xt, ut))dutdxt by approxi-
mating the reward function with a second-order Taylor ex-
pansion. (Levine & Koltun, 2012) developed the Contin-
uous Inverse Optimal Control (CIOC) algorithm based on
this approximation. Though, their approach is limited to the
single-agent case with deterministic environment transitions.
We will show how to extend their algorithm to the two-agent
setting.
Value Recursion Formulas
The procedure that we obtain in this section is illustrated in
algorithm 1. We take a reference trajectory τk - a sequence
of states xt and actions ukt - of each agent k ∈ (i, j) and
approximate the reward function rk close to the reference
trajectory. This will allow us to derive a local policy approx-
imation pik - an approximation that works best if the agent
stays close to the reference trajectory - by working our way
from the end of the reference trajectory to the beginning
calculating the value function Vk(xt) for each time-step. In
other words, the formulas are recursive in nature. Where
does the reference trajectory come from? It may be a ran-
Algorithm 1 GS-CIOC
Input: Reference trajectories τk, k ∈ {i, j}
Taylor expansion (8) of rewards along τk
Initialize Vk(xT )← 0
for t← T to 1 do
{Update Gaussian policy:}
µkt ← Solve (17) for mean action
M˜(kk)t ← Determine precision matrix (15)
{Recompute value function, given updated policy:}
if t > 1 then
Vk(xt−1)← Value recursion (22) - (26)
end if
end for
Return: Policies pii and pij
domly chosen state and action sequence, or it may represent
actual observation data.
We sketch the derivation of algorithm 1 starting at the final
time-step (the horizon) of the reference trajectories τi, τj .
Here the Q-function of agent i and by extension the policy
pii can be calculated as follows
Qi(x¯T−1, u¯iT ) =
∫
p(x¯T |x¯T−1, u¯iT , u¯jT )
pij(u¯jT |x¯T−1)ri(x¯T , u¯iT , u¯jT )du¯jT dx¯T (7)
Even though p(x¯T |x¯T−1, u¯iT , u¯jT ) is deterministic, the in-
tegral is intractable in general. We circumvent this problem
by approximating the reward function ri using a second-
order Taylor expansion around the fixed reference trajecto-
ries4.
ri(x¯t, u¯it, u¯jt) ≈ rit+x¯Tjt
(
Hˆ(ji)tx¯it
)
+u¯Tjt
(
H˜(ji)tu¯it
)
+
2∑
k=1
[
x¯Tkt
(1
2
Hˆ(kk)t
)
x¯kt + u¯
T
kt
(1
2
H˜(kk)t
)
u¯kt+
u¯Tktg˜kt + x¯
T
ktgˆkt
]
(8)
H and g refer to the Hessians and gradients w.r.t the states
and actions of both agents.
Hˆ(nm)t =
∂2ri
∂x¯nt∂x¯mt
, H˜(nm)t =
∂2ri
∂u¯nt∂u¯mt
(9)
gˆnt =
∂ri
∂x¯nt
, g˜nt =
∂ri
∂u¯nt
(10)
4Here, we stay close to the single-agent LQR derivation in
(Levine & Koltun, 2012) where actions and states separate in the
reward function r(xt, ut) = g(xt) + f(ut). This is also the struc-
ture that we assume in the experiments in the experimental section.
For a derivation that considers more general reward functions,
please refer to the supplementary material.
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The reward function is now quadratic with
x¯t = xt − x∗t , u¯kt = ukt − u∗kt (11)
where x∗ and u∗ refer to the fixed reference trajectories. The
state x¯t = [x¯it, x¯jt] is split into the agent specific sub-states
which are directly controlled by each agent.
We need one additional approximation to solve the integral
in (7). Namely, we linearize the dynamics
x¯kt = Aktx¯kt−1 +Bktu¯kt (12)
Akt =
∂x¯kt
∂x¯kt−1
, Bkt =
∂x¯kt
∂u¯kt−1
(13)
Applying the linearization and the quadratic approximation
of the reward function turns (7) into a tractable integral. In
particular, QiT is quadratic in the actions u¯iT . Therefore,
the policy of agent i is a Gaussian policy. The same is true
for agent j since we apply the same approximations, i.e. pij
is a Gaussian policy. The mean of that policy is (general
result)
µit = −M˜−1(ii)t
(
g˜it+H˜(ij)tµjt+B
T
it qˆijt+B
T
itQˆ(ii)tAitx¯it−1
)
(14)
M˜(ii)t is the precision matrix of the Gaussian policy of agent
i.
M˜(nm)t = B
T
ntQˆ(nm)tBmt + H˜(nm)t (15)
Additional definitions of symbols used in the equations
above
qˆit = gˆit + vˆit, Qˆ(nm)t = Hˆ(nm)t + Vˆ(nm)t (16)
(14) is a system of linear equations in µit and µjt of the
form Ax = b.[
δ
(i)
ij
(
M˜−1(jj)t
)(j)
δ
(j)
ji −
(
M˜(ii)t
)(i)]
µit =
α
(i)
i − δ(i)ij
(
M˜−1(jj)t
)(j)
α
(j)
j +(
β
(i)
i − δ(i)ij
(
M˜−1(jj)t
)(j)
γ
(j)
ji
)
x¯it−1+(
γ
(i)
ij − δ(i)ij
(
M˜−1(jj)t
)(j)
β
(j)
j
)
x¯jt−1 (17)
with
α
(i)
i =
[
g˜it +B
T
it qˆit
]
, β
(i)
i = B
T
itQˆ(ii)tAit (18)
γ
(i)
ij =B
T
itQˆ(ij)tAjt, δ
(i)
ij = M˜(ij)t (19)
The (i) index indicates which agent the derivatives/ value
functions refer to. We do not only recover the mean of agent
j but also that of agent i.
At last, we calculate the value function using equation (4).
The Q-function is a quadratic polynomial in the states and
actions. Therefore, the integral is tractable, and we end up
with a value function with the following structure
Vi(x¯T ) = x¯
T
jT
(
Vˆ(ji)T x¯iT
)
+
2∑
k=1
[
x¯TkT
(1
2
Vˆ(kk)T
)
x¯kT + x¯
T
kT vˆkT
]
+ const (20)
How do we obtain the Vˆ and vˆ matrices? We collect all the
terms that are quadratic or linear in x¯kt. The general result
is given in equation (22) onward.
Now, that we know ViT , we apply the same procedure to
the previous time step, i.e. the calculations are repetitive. In
short, we derive the Q-function of the next time-step (T −1).
Qi(x¯T−2, u¯iT−1) =∫
p(x¯T−1|x¯T−2, u¯iT−1, u¯jT−1)pij(u¯jT−1|x¯T−2)
(
r(x¯T−1, u¯iT−1, u¯jT−1) + Vi(x¯T )
)
du¯jT−1dx¯T−1 (21)
Given the reward approximation, the linearization of the
dynamics and the quadratic state dependency of the value
function ViT in equation (20) this integral is tractable again.
Working our way along the full trajectory, we obtain re-
cursive formulas for the value functions (meaning the Vˆ
matrices and vˆ vectors in (20)). Due to space constraints,
we will state the results and refer the interested reader to the
supplementary material.
Vˆ(ii)t−1 = ΠTjt
[
M˜(jj)t − M˜(ji)tM˜−1(ii)tM˜(ij)t]Πjt
+
[
ATitQˆ(ij)tBjt −ATitQˆ(ii)tBitM˜−1(ii)tM˜(ij)t
]
Πjt
+ΠTjt
[
ATitQˆ(ij)tBjt −ATitQˆ(ii)tBitM˜−1(ii)tM˜(ij)t
]T
+ATitQˆ(ii)tAit−ATitQˆT(ii)tBitM˜−1(ii)tBTitQˆ(ii)tAit
(22)
Vˆ(jj)t−1 = ΩTjt
[
M˜(jj)t − M˜(ji)tM˜−1(ii)tM˜(ij)t
]
Ωjt
+
[
ATjtQˆ(jj)tBjt −ATjtQˆ(ji)tBitM˜−1(ii)tM˜(ij)t
]
Ωjt
+ΩTjt
[
ATjtQˆ(jj)tBjt −ATjtQˆ(ji)tBitM˜−1(ii)tM˜(ij)t
]T
+ATjtQˆ(jj)tAjt −ATjtQˆ(ji)tBitM˜−1(ii)tBTitQˆ(ij)tAjt
(23)
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Algorithm 2 Iterative GS-CIOC
Input: Initial trajectories τi, τj learning rate η
repeat
pii, pij ← GS-CIOC( τi, τj)
{Update τi, τj}
Roll-out Gaussian policies with scaled mean ηµkt and
covariance = 0 (i.e. deterministic policy)
until max iterations
Return: Policies pii and pij
Vˆ(ji)t−1 = ΩTjt
[
M˜(jj)t − M˜(ji)tM˜−1(ii)tM˜(ij)t
]
Πjt
+ΩTjt
[
ATitQˆ(ij)tBjt −ATitQˆ(ii)tBitM˜−1(ii)tM˜(ij)t
]T
+
[
ATjtQˆ(jj)tBjt −ATjtQˆ(ji)tBitM˜−1(ii)tM˜(ij)t
]
Πjt
+ATjtQˆ(ji)tAit −ATjtQˆ(ji)tBitM˜−1(ii)tBTitQˆ(ii)tAit
(24)
vˆjt−1 = ΩTjt
[
M˜(jj)t − M˜(ji)tM˜−1(ii)tM˜(ij)t
]
νjt
+
[
ATjtQˆ(jj)tBjt −ATjtQˆ(ji)tBitM˜−1(ii)tM˜(ij)t
]
νjt
+ΩTjt
(
g˜jt +B
T
jtqˆjt − M˜(ji)tM˜−1(ii)t
[
g˜it +B
T
it qˆit
])
+ATjtqˆjt −ATjtQˆ(ji)tBitM˜−1(ii)t[g˜it +BTit qˆit] (25)
vˆit−1 = ΠTjt
[
M˜(jj)t − M˜(ji)tM˜−1(ii)tM˜(ij)t
]
νjt
+
[
ATitQˆ(ij)tBjt −ATitQˆ(ii)tBitM˜−1(ii)tM˜(ij)t
]
νjt
+ΠTjt
(
g˜jt +B
T
jtqˆjt − M˜(ji)tM˜−1(ii)t
[
g˜it +B
T
it qˆit
])
+ATitqˆit−ATitQˆ(ii)tBitM˜−1it
[
g˜it +B
T
it qˆit
]
(26)
The parts of the formulas that are highlighted in blue cor-
respond to the single agent value recursion formulas from
(Levine & Koltun, 2012). If the reward is a single agent
reward function, the value recursion formulas will reduce to
the highlighted parts.
Π and Ω refer to the reactive policy of agent j, i.e. they
encode how agent j will react to deviations in the position
of agent i (or agent j itself). The mean action of agent j is
given by
µjt = νjt + Πjtx¯it−1 + Ωjtx¯jt−1 (27)
Iterative GS-CIOC
We can use the algorithm described above to generate pre-
dictions (rollout policy), but this will only result in globally
optimal solutions for quadratic rewards and linear (deter-
ministic) environment transitions. In that case, the Taylor
expansion around any given reference trajectory is exact
everywhere. If the rewards are not quadratic, the quadratic
approximation of the reward and value function is, of course,
inaccurate and holds only close to a given reference trajec-
tory. Though, we can execute GS-CIOC iteratively to find
local optima (with no convergence guarantee). We start with
an initial trajectory and approximate the rewards and dynam-
ics locally. We obtain a Gaussian policy by executing the
value recursion described above and update the trajectory by
following the policy up to a learning rate η. One possibility
is to scale the mean of the policy via ηµ. This way, we can
control how much the update deviates from the reference
trajectory. This algorithm resembles the iLQG algorithm
and has been explored recently for the multi-agent setting in
dynamic games by (Schwarting et al., 2019b; Fridovich-Keil
et al., 2019b). We illustrate the procedure in algorithm 2.
In general, it is important to note that neither (Schwart-
ing et al., 2019b) nor (Fridovich-Keil et al., 2019b), nor
our approach recover Nash-equilibria (NE) since the best re-
sponses computed are approximations that work only locally
w.r.t. the current reference trajectory. The agents might not
find a better response which lies far away from the current
reference trajectory. See also (Oliehoek et al., 2019) for a
discussion on why local NE can be far from a NE.
5. Recovering Reward Parameters
Until now, we have discussed how to construct a local policy
given a set of reference trajectories and a reward function
(see algorithms 1 and 2). However, since our goal is to use
the predicted behaviours in real-life traffic interactions, we
need the capability to infer the parameters θ of a reward
function that captures human behaviour. For this purpose,
we present an algorithm that can be run before deploying
algorithm 2, to infer realistic rewards. Specifically, given
observation data of, e.g. a pedestrian interacting with a
car, we can infer the reward parameters by maximizing the
log-likelihood of the observed data
θ∗ =
arg max
θ
1
|τ |
∑
τ,(u,x)∈τ
ln pθ(xi0:T−1, xj0:T−1, ui1:T , uj1:T )
= arg max
θ
1
|τ |
∑
τ,(u,x)∈τ
(∑
t
lnpii,θ(uit|xit−1, xjt−1)
+
∑
t
lnpij,θ(ujt|xit−1, xjt−1)
)
(28)
θ refers to the reward parameters and |τ | to the number
of trajectories τ in the data set. pii,θ corresponds to the
policy of agent i (e.g. pedestrian) and is calculated with
GS-CIOC. Indeed, it is possible to perform backpropagation
through the entire GS-CIOC algorithm. The procedure is
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Algorithm 3 Reward Inference
Input: τi, τj from data, initial θ
repeat
pii,θ, pij,θ ← GS-CIOC( τi, τj )
Gradient ascent step on objective (28)
until max iterations or convergence of θ
Return: Reward parameters θ
illustrated in algorithm 3. We optimize the objective (28)
using gradient ascent. Overall, the approach is similar to the
single-agent reward inference of CIOC.
6. DIVERSITY IN ACTION
In the following section, we demonstrate the capability of
GS-CIOC and the main difference to a centralized multi-
agent formulation of CIOC that we will call M-CIOC (for
multi-agent). CIOC is originally a single-agent algorithm,
though, we can transform it into a multi-agent algorithm
by assuming both agents as one (four-dimensional actions
instead of two). This is a typical approach in the literature
used to model multi-agent interactions in a simplified way
(see for example, (Kretzschmar et al., 2016; Pfeiffer et al.,
2016)). Everything is implemented using JAX (Bradbury
et al., 2018).
Figure 1. Two agents (e.g. pedestrians) move towards a goal (red
circle). The dashed lines indicate the shortest path. Due to an
interaction reward, the agents are incentivized to walk towards
each other.
Quadratic Rewards: The following setup is useful for un-
derstanding the validity of the implementation of GS-CIOC
and one of the differences to M-CIOC. We illustrate the
scenario in figure 1: Two agents move towards a goal
and are pulled together by an interaction reward, simi-
lar to people who belong together form a small group.
We assume a cooperative reward function of the form
r = −α1(x21 + x22) − α2(u21 + u22) − α3(u1 + u2)2 (re-
ward parameters, αi ≥ 0, x-states, u-actions), i.e. both
agents maximize the same reward5. The dynamics are linear
with xt = xt−1 +ut. We initialize one agent at x = y = 20
and the other at x = 20, y = −20. The reward function in-
5They do so sub-optimally, which is why their actions show
variance.
centivizes both agents to move towards x = y = 0. Though,
they cannot do so in one step as non-zero actions are pe-
nalized quadratically. −α3(u1 + u2)2 is special in that it
induces an interaction of the agents. In particular, the term is
maximized if u1 = −u2. We roll-out 2000 trajectories over
T = 14 time-steps using M-CIOC and GS-CIOC. Figure
2 depicts the results. The mean solution of M-CIOC and
GS-CIOC is practically identical, while the variances in the
actions of each agent differ significantly.
Figure 2. We illustrate the actions of an agent for the scenario de-
scribed in figure 1. The reward setup is fully cooperative, i.e. both
agents receive the same reward. Both M-CIOC and GS-CIOC
can be applied to roll-out action sequences. Given 2000 roll-outs,
the mean actions are in agreement between the two algorithms.
Though, the standard deviation (shaded region) varies significantly.
The reason for this is that agents can coordinate perfectly in M-
CIOC. Therefore, one agent can compensate for larger deviations
of the other agent from the mean and vice versa, leading to larger
possible action amplitudes around the mean (they can minimize
the interaction reward more effectively). GS-CIOC assumes unco-
ordinated execution of the action sequences, thus, exhibiting lower
variance (interaction reward constricts movement around mean
trajectory).
The reason for this is as follows. M-CIOC assumes agents
that can coordinate their actions perfectly. This is not the
case for GS-CIOC. While the deviations from the mean
trajectory are almost decorrelated for GS-CIOC with a cor-
relation coefficient of−0.1 (correlation between agent 1 and
2), those of M-CIOC are highly correlated with a correlation
coefficient of −0.7. The variance resulting from M-CIOC
algorithm is larger by a factor of 1.9 than that for GS-CIOC.
The reason is that if agent 1 chooses a specific action ∆u1
(∆u1, deviation from mean trajectory/ expected action),
then agent 2 can choose the action ∆u2 = −∆u1, cancel-
ing each other out in the interaction reward −α3(u1 + u2)2.
Through coordination, the agents experience a wider range
of possible actions in M-CIOC. This is not necessarily a
desirable property as we will demonstrate for the task of
inferring the reward function.
To test how well the proposed algorithm can recover re-
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wards from behaviour, we generate data trajectories based
on a ground truth reward function. Given 2000 roll-outs
of GS-CIOC we apply algorithm 3. We initialize the pa-
rameters at α = [1, 1, 1] and perform gradient ascent with
a learning rate of 10−3 until the objective converges. The
result is α1 = 0.2(0.2), α2 = 1.0(1.0), α3 = 3.0(3.0).
The values in the brackets indicate the true reward param-
eters. As we can see algorithm 3 recovered the rewards
successfully.
What if we apply algorithm 3 to M-CIOC 2000 roll-outs?
Again, we initialize the parameters at α = [1, 1, 1] and
perform gradient ascent until convergence. We obtain:
α1 = 0.1(0.2), α2 = 0.5(1.0), α3 = 1.6(3.0). The
inferred reward is almost half of the true reward, which
matches the difference in observed variances of a factor of
1.9. Depending on the application, either a reward inference
algorithm based on M-CIOC or GS-CIOC will be more ac-
curate (assuming fully cooperative reward functions). If
a centralized controller controls the agents, then M-CIOC
should be preferred, though, for decentralized controllers
GS-CIOC is the better choice (i.e. algorithm 3).
We also tested the reward inference using different reward
parameters with α1 = 0.4(0.4), α2 = 1.5(1.5), α3 =
2.5(2.5) for one agent and α1 = 0.2(0.2), α2 = 1.0(1.0),
α3 = 3.0(3.0) for the other agent. Again, we were able
to reproduce the parameter values using algorithm 3 (2000
trajectories, initialization at α = [1, 1, 1], GS-CIOC for roll-
out and local policy approximation). In this case, M-CIOC
cannot be used since it cannot handle different rewards per
agent.
Figure 3. A pedestrian approaches a zebra crossing. The car will
yield, though the pedestrian may be more or less socially inclined,
speeding up so that the car can go on earlier or continue to walk at
her most comfortable pace.
Traffic Interaction Scenario: A major advantage of
GS-CIOC is the ease of defining reward functions for sepa-
rate agents. Furthermore, in contrast to deterministic best
responses, the maximum-entropy formulation is a form of
reward-proportional error prediction, which was shown to
capture human (boundedly-rational) behaviour well (Wright
& Leyton-Brown, 2010). We demonstrate the interaction of
a vehicle and a pedestrian at a zebra crossing in a simpli-
fied setting (see figure 3). We consider one case where the
pedestrian also optimizes some of the reward of the vehi-
cle (progress towards goal), i.e. the pedestrian is partially
cooperative, vs the scenario where the pedestrian does not
consider any of the vehicle’s reward. We implemented the
iterative variant of the GS-CIOC algorithm. We roll-out
12 time-steps and initialize the trajectories with each agent
standing still. Please refer to figure 4 for the results. The
optimization takes 0.5s on a Titan Xp for a single trajectory
and 0.6s for a batch of 100 trajectories, opening up the pos-
sibility of probing multiple initializations in real-time. For
more details on the experiment (e.g. reward setup), please
refer to the supplementary material.
The resulting behaviour varies significantly, underscoring
the importance of being able to formulate reward functions
on the continuum between full cooperation and no cooper-
ation at all. In particular, the socially-minded pedestrian
only considers a small part of the overall car specific reward
function (namely, the goal reward). In a fully cooperative
setup, both agents would be forced to share all of their re-
wards which complicates engineering a reward function that
matches real-world behaviour.
Figure 4. The pedestrian crosses the zebra crossing with an ap-
proaching car waiting until the pedestrian is on the other side (see
also figure 3). The y-axis indicates the position relative to where
the car and the pedestrian path intersect. The red (blue) curve
corresponds to a pedestrian (car) that only considers her own re-
ward. The grey curve corresponds to a pedestrian that values the
progress of the car. Therefore, the latter speeds up in the beginning
to make room for the car. The shaded regions indicate one standard
deviation around the mean trajectory.
7. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a novel algorithm for predicting boundedly
rational human behaviour in multi-agent stochastic games
efficiently. Furthermore, the algorithm can be used to infer
the rewards of those agents. We demonstrated its advantage
for inferring rewards when agents execute their actions inde-
pendently with limited communication. Also, we illustrated
how diverse rewards affect the behaviour of agents and the
variance inherent in maximum-entropy methods that model
boundedly rational agents. We leave for future work the
application to real-world traffic data.
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8. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
ADDITIONAL BASELINES
We provide two additional baselines. One that compares the
policy roll-outs of iterative GS-CIOC to those of a policy
obtained from value iteration. The other checks how well
the single-agent CIOC algorithm (Levine & Koltun, 2012)
performs on multi-agent data.
Value Iteration Baseline
We will expand on the analysis in the experimental section
of the main paper. Namely, we introduce a baseline to
understand if iterative GS-CIOC finds a reasonable policy
approximation. Figure 3 summarizes the toy example we
consider. A pedestrian crosses the street, and an approaching
car stops so that the pedestrian can cross safely.
The environment transitions are linear with xkt = xkt−1 +
ukt. The reward setup is as follows. Both agents receive
• a quadratic lane keeping reward
• a quadratic velocity reward
• a quadratic goal reward
Additionally, the car receives an interaction reward of the
form
log(|xc|+ 0.1) ∗ sigmoid(−xc + 6.) ∗ sigmoid(xc)
∗ sigmoid(−yp) (29)
where xc is the offset to the intersection point for the car
in x-direction and yp is the offset to the intersection point
for the pedestrian in y-direction. The pedestrian may also
receive a reward for hurrying up while crossing. Namely,
the pedestrian also receives the quadratic goal reward of the
car on top of its own reward. We refer to that pedestrian as
being socially minded.
We apply two methods to obtain a policy. The first method
is iterative GS-CIOC, as described in the main paper. The
second is value iteration using the soft-Bellman equation
and a discretization of the state and action space. We per-
form value iteration for one agent at a time while the policy
of the other agent is fixed, i.e. the policies are updated it-
eratively. These updates continue until the policies of both
agents converge. We compare the policy roll-outs of both
methods in figures 5 and 6.
Overall, the mean policy of iterative GS-CIOC converges
close to the mean policy of the value iteration algorithm.
Though, it gets stuck in local optima. Depending on the
initial trajectories iterative GS-CIOC can slightly over- or
under-shoot the value iteration reference trajectories. Fig-
ures 5 and 6 correspond to an initialization of both agents
standing still at their respective starting positions (-6 and 6).
Apart from the mean policy roll-outs, the standard deviations
show differences as well. Given only quadratic rewards, the
iterative GS-CIOC standard deviation from the mean for
the pedestrian (blue) in figure 5 agrees well with that of the
value iteration algorithm. Though, the standard deviation
is lower for the car (red) due to the non-quadratic nature
of the interaction reward as GS-CIOC approximates the
reward function with a second-order Taylor expansion. In
other words, GS-CIOC may provide a biased estimate of
the standard deviation.
Figure 5. The pedestrian is not socially minded and crosses the
zebra crossing without paying much attention to the car. The blue
and red curves indicate a solution that we obtained from value
iteration. The grey curves correspond to the solution of iterative
GS-CIOC. Due to the localized nature of GS-CIOC, the mean
trajectory does not match the solution of the value iteration per-
fectly. Given that GS-CIOC will consider the reward function up
to a second-order Taylor expansion, the estimates of the standard
deviation are not identical to those of the value iteration solution.
The pedestrian only experiences quadratic rewards, while the car
receives non-quadratic interaction rewards.
Single-Agent CIOC Baseline
Here we show which reward parameters CIOC infers given
the ground-truth roll-outs of GS-CIOC in a non-cooperative
reward setup. Since CIOC assumes a single agent setup, ap-
plying the algorithm to infer rewards for interacting agents
corresponds to the assumption that other agents are non-
reacting dynamic obstacles that follow pre-computed paths.
We have already established that GS-CIOC produces the
same mean trajectories as a multi-agent formulation of
CIOC that we termed M-CIOC given cooperative rewards.
The only difference was the resulting variance which we
were able to explain in terms of the perfect coordination
between agents for M-CIOC vs the decentralized execution
in GS-CIOC.
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Figure 6. Same as figure 5, except here the pedestrian values the
progress of the car, i.e. the pedestrian is more socially minded.
The red and blue curves indicate the solution obtained from value
iteration and the grey curves correspond to the solution of iterative
GS-CIOC.
The experimental setup is the same as that for the quadratic
reward experiments in the main paper. Given 2000 roll-
outs of GS-CIOC we apply CIOC to each agent. We
repeat the procedure three times with varying seed val-
ues for the random number generators. The ranges of
the reward parameters that we obtain are α = [0.245 −
0.248(0.40), 1.017 − 1.043(1.50), 1.945 − 1.954(2.50)]
for one agent and α = [0.122 − 0.123(0.20), 0.712 −
0.723(1.00), 2.042− 2.060(3.00)] for the other agent. The
ground-truth reward parameters are indicated inside the
brackets. CIOC cannot recover the correct rewards. In
particular, the difference cannot be explained with a sin-
gle reward scaling factor. The scaling factors would be
[0.613−0.619, 0.678−0.696, 0.778−0.782] for one agent
and [0.612− 0.617, 0.712− 0.723, 0.681− 0.687] for the
other agent. Therefore, the variation of the scaling factor
is up to 20% in between the reward parameters of a single
agent (e.g. 0.619 vs 0.778). This suggests that CIOC may in-
cur a significant bias when estimating the reward parameters
of interacting agents.
DERIVATION OF VALUE RECURSION
FORMULAS
This section provides additional details on the derivation of
the value recursion formulas in the methods section of the
paper. Please read the methods section first. Also, our calcu-
lations follow a similar path like those in the supplementary
material of (Levine & Koltun, 2012) for the single-agent
case (LQR Likelihood Derivation, section B, Link).
Linearization of the Dynamics
x¯kt = Aktx¯kt−1 +Bktu¯kt (30)
Akt =
∂x¯kt
∂x¯kt−1
(31)
Bkt =
∂x¯kt
∂u¯kt−1
(32)
Relevant Integrals
∫
(u¯Tjtφu)N (µjt; Σjt)du¯jt = µTjtφu (33)∫ (
x¯Tjtφx
)
N (µjt; Σjt)du¯jt = χTjtφx (34)
∫
(u¯TjtΦuu¯jt)N (µjt; Σjt)du¯jt =
µTjtΦuµjt +
∑
nm
(
Φu
)
nm
(
Σjt
)
nm
(35)
∫ (
x¯TjtΦxx¯jt
)
N (µjt; Σjt)du¯jt =
χTjtΦxχjt +
∑
nm
(
BTjtΦxBjt
)
nm
(
Σjt
)
nm
(36)
where
χjt = Ajtx¯jt−1 +Bjtµjt (37)
is the mean state that agent j transitions to.
Quadratic Reward Approximation
In contrast to (Levine & Koltun, 2012), we will also consider
reward terms where states and actions mix. The full second-
order Taylor expansion of the reward is given by
r(x¯it, x¯jt, u¯it, u¯jt) ≈
rt +

x¯it
x¯jt
u¯it
u¯jt

T
Ht

x¯it
x¯jt
u¯it
u¯jt
+

x¯it
x¯jt
u¯it
u¯jt

T
gt
= rt + x¯
T
jt
(
H(xjxi)tx¯it
)
+ u¯Tjt
(
H(ujui)tu¯it
)
+ u¯Tit
(
H(uixj)tx¯jt
)
+ u¯Tjt
(
H(ujxi)tx¯it
)
+
∑
k∈{i,j}
[
x¯Tkt
(1
2
H(xkxk)t
)
x¯kt + u¯
T
kt
(1
2
H(ukuk)t
)
u¯kt
+ u¯Tktgukt + x¯
T
ktgxkt
]
(38)
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H(xnxm)t =
∂2r
∂x¯nt∂x¯mt
(39)
H(unum)t =
∂2r
∂u¯nt∂u¯mt
(40)
H(unxm)t =
∂2r
∂u¯nt∂x¯mt
(41)
gxnt =
∂r
∂x¯nt
(42)
gunt =
∂r
∂u¯nt
(43)
We assume that the derivatives commute, i.e.
HT(umxn)t = H(xnum)t (44)
We can expand some of the x¯kt using the linearization of
the dynamics in (30). This allows us to introduce a few con-
venient re-definitions of the Hessian matrices and gradients
which we will use for the remainder of the derivation.
H˜(ji)t = B
T
jtH
T
(uixj)t
+H(ujxi)tBit +H(ujui)t (45)
H˜(ii)t =
1
2
(
H(uixi)tBit +B
T
itH
T
(uixi)t
)
+H(uiui)t
(46)
H˜(jj)t =
1
2
(
H(ujxj)tBjt +B
T
jtH
T
(ujxj)t
)
+H(ujuj)t
(47)
Hˆ(nm)t = H(xnxm)t (48)
g˜it = guit +H(uixi)tAitx¯it−1 +H(uixj)tAjtx¯jt−1
(49)
g˜jt = gujt +H(ujxj)tAjtx¯jt−1 +H(ujxi)tAitx¯it−1
(50)
gˆnt = gxnt (51)
The reward approximation given the re-defined Hessians
and gradients is as follows.
r(x¯it, x¯jt, u¯it, u¯jt) ≈
rt + x¯
T
jt
(
Hˆ(ji)tx¯it
)
+ u¯Tjt
(
H˜(ji)tu¯it
)
+
2∑
k∈{i,j}
[
x¯Tkt
(1
2
Hˆ(kk)t
)
x¯kt + u¯
T
kt
(1
2
H˜(kk)t
)
u¯kt+
u¯Tktg˜kt + x¯
T
ktgˆkt
]
(52)
As we have seen in the methods section, the value function
will be quadratic in the states given the reward approxima-
tion.
Vit+1(x¯1t, x¯2t) = x¯
T
jt
(
Vˆ(ji)tx¯it
)
+
2∑
k=1
[
x¯Tkt
(1
2
Vˆ(kk)t
)
x¯kt + x¯
T
ktvˆkt
]
+ c (53)
Vˆ(nm)t =
∂2r
∂x¯nt∂x¯mt
(54)
vˆnt =
∂r
∂x¯nt
(55)
(56)
The constant c in the value function is going to be irrelevant
(does not affect policy) and will be dropped from now on.
Q-function
Qit(x¯it−1, x¯jt−1, u¯it) =∫
p(x¯it, x¯jt|x¯it−1, x¯jt−1, u¯it, u¯jt)pijt(u¯jt|x¯it−1, x¯jt−1)(
r(x¯it, x¯jt, u¯it, u¯jt) + Vit+1(x¯it, x¯jt)
)
du¯jtdx¯itdx¯jt
(57)
As we have argued in the methods section, the pol-
icy pijt is a Gaussian policy of the form pijt ∼
exp
(− 12 (u¯jt − µjt)TΣ−1jt (u¯jt − µjt)). Substituting 52
and 53 in 57 results in quite a few terms of the type 33-
36 and trivial terms (simple Gaussian integral).
We collect the terms so that they resemble the integrals in
33-36 and define
Φx =
1
2
Vˆ(jj)t +
1
2
Hˆ(jj)t (58)
φx = Hˆ(ji)tx¯it + Vˆ(ji)tx¯it + gˆjt + vˆjt (59)
for the terms where x¯jt needs to be integrated over and
Φu =
1
2
H˜(jj)t (60)
φu = H˜(ji)tu¯it + g˜jt (61)
for those with u¯jt as the integration variable.
After integration and dropping a few irrelevant constants
(no state or action dependencies) we get the following Q-
function.
Qit(x¯1t−1, x¯2t−1, u¯it) = g(x¯it, u¯it) + χTjtΦxχjt
µTjtΦuµjt + χ
T
jtφx(x¯it) + µ
T
jtφu(u¯it) (62)
where
g(x¯it, u¯it) = x¯
T
it
(1
2
Hˆ(ii)t
)
x¯it + u¯
T
it
(1
2
H˜(ii)t
)
u¯it+
u¯Titg˜it + x¯
T
itgˆit + x¯
T
it
(1
2
Vˆ(ii)t
)
x¯it + x¯
T
itvˆit (63)
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Value Function
To derive the value recursion for the decentralized set-
ting, we rearrange the values in the Q-function so that
it resembles the single-agent version. The integration
Vit = log
∫
exp(Qit(u¯it))du¯it that provides us with the
value function at time-step t is then the same as that of the
single agent case. We give the single-agent result as a ref-
erence (taken from supplementary material of (Levine &
Koltun, 2012)).
Single agent reference solution of (Levine & Koltun,
2012).
Qt(x¯t−1, u¯t) =
1
2
u¯Tt H˜tu¯t + u¯
T
t g˜t (64)
+
1
2
T
[Atx¯t−1 +Btu¯t]︸ ︷︷ ︸
x¯t
[
Hˆt + Vˆt
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Qˆt
[Atx¯t−1 +Btu¯t]
(65)
+ [Atx¯t−1 +Btu¯t]T [gˆt + vˆt]︸ ︷︷ ︸
qˆt
(66)
The resulting value function Vt = log
∫
exp(Qt(u¯t))du¯t is
Vt(x¯t−1) =
1
2
x¯Tt−1A
T
t QˆtAtx¯t−1 + x¯
T
t−1A
T
t qˆt (67)
− 1
2
µ˜Tt M˜tµ˜t −
1
2
log | − M˜t| (68)
with
µ˜t = M˜
−1
t
(
g˜t +B
T
t qˆt +B
T
t QˆtAtx¯t−1) (69)
M˜t = H˜t +B
T
t QˆtBt (70)
We use the single-agent solution as a template for the two-
agent derivation of the value function given the Q-function.
Qit(x¯1t−1, x¯2t−1, u¯it) =
1
2
x¯TitQˆitx¯it +
1
2
u¯TitH˜(ii)tu¯it + u¯itg˜
∗
ijt + x¯
T
itqˆijt + Cjt
(71)
with
Qˆit = Hˆ(ii)t + Vˆ(ii)t (72)
g˜∗ijt = g˜it + H˜(ij)tµjt (73)
qˆijt = gˆit + vˆit + Hˆ(ij)tχjt + Vˆ(ij)tχjt (74)
Cjt = χ
T
jtΦxχjt+µ
T
jtΦuµjt+χ
T
jt[gˆjt+vˆjt]+µ
T
jtg˜jt (75)
Cjt =
1
2
x¯Tjt−1A
T
jtQˆjtAjtx¯jt−1 +
1
2
µTjtM˜jtµjt+
x¯Tjt−1A
T
jtQˆjtBjtµjt + χ
T
jt[gˆjt + vˆjt] + µ
T
jtg˜jt (76)
The value function for timestep t is
Vit(x¯it−1, x¯jt−1) =
1
2
x¯Tit−1A
T
itQˆitAitx¯it−1+
x¯Tit−1A
T
itqˆijt −
1
2
µTitM˜itµit −
1
2
log | − M˜it|+ Cjt (77)
µit = −M˜−1it
(
g˜∗ijt +B
T
it qˆijt +B
T
itQˆitAitx¯it−1
)
(78)
M˜it = H˜(ii)t +B
T
itQˆitBit (79)
µit corresponds to the expected action of agent i considering
the interaction effects with agent j. M˜it is the precision
matrix that corresponds to the actions of agent i. Therefore,
the solution resembles the single agent case.
Deriving Mean
We expand (78) by substituting the definitions of g˜∗, g˜, qˆ
and χ. The result is a linear equation in the mean actions
µmt.
−µit =M˜−1it
[
g˜it +B
T
it qˆit
]
+ M˜−1it B
T
itQˆitAitx¯it−1
+M˜−1it BitQˆ(ij)tAjtx¯jt−1 + M˜
−1
it M˜(ij)tµjt
=M˜−1it
(
α
(i)
i + β
(i)
i x¯it−1 + γ
(i)
ij x¯jt−1 + δ
(i)
ij µjt
)
(80)
⇒
[
δ
(i)
ij
(
M˜−1jt
)(j)
δ
(j)
ji −
(
M˜it
)(i)]
µit =
α
(i)
i − δ(i)ij
(
M˜−1jt
)(j)
α
(j)
j +(
β
(i)
i − δ(i)ij
(
M˜−1jt
)(j)
γ
(j)
ji
)
x¯it−1+(
γ
(i)
ij − δ(i)ij
(
M˜−1jt
)(j)
β
(j)
j
)
x¯jt−1 (81)
with
α
(i)
i =
[
guit +B
T
it qˆit
]
(82)
β
(i)
i =Qˆ
†
itAit (83)
γ
(i)
ij =Qˆ
†
(ij)tAjt (84)
δ
(i)
ij =M˜(ij)t (85)
Qˆ†(mn)t =Humxn +B
T
mtQˆ(mn)t (86)
The (i) index indicates which agent the derivatives/ value
functions refer to. We indicate the index on the left side of
the above equations but drop it otherwise for brevity.
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Value Recursion Formulas
Now that we understand what the Q-function and the policy
look like, we determine the set of recursive equations that
provide us with the value function matrices at timestep t.
Vit(x¯it−1, x¯jt−1) =
[
1
2
x¯Tit−1A
T
itQˆitAitx¯it−1
+ x¯Tit−1A
T
itqˆit −
1
2
µ¯TitM˜itµ¯it −
1
2
log | − M˜it|
− 1
2
µ∗Tit M˜itµ
∗
it − µ¯TitM˜itµ∗it
]
single agent
+
[
1
2
χTjtDχχχjt +
1
2
µTjtDµµµjt + µ
T
jtDµχχjt
+ µTjtDµxx¯it−1 + χ
T
jtDχxx¯it−1 + µ
T
jtDµ
+ µTjtD
∗
µ + χ
T
jtDχ + χ
T
jtD
∗
χ
]
interaction
(87)
µ¯it =− M˜−1it
(
guit +B
T
it qˆit +B
T
itQˆitAitx¯it−1
)
(88)
µ∗it =− M˜−1it
(
HuixiAixit−1 +HuixjAjxjt−1
)
(89)
Dχχ = Qˆ(jj)t − Qˆ(ji)tBitM˜−1it BTitQˆ(ij)t (90)
Dµµ = H˜(jj)t − H˜(ji)tM˜−1it H˜(ij)t (91)
Dµχ = −H˜(ji)tM˜−1it BTitQˆ(ij)t (92)
Dµx = −H˜(ji)tM˜−1it BTitQˆitAit (93)
Dχx = Qˆ(ji)tAit − Qˆ(ji)tBitM˜−1it BTitQˆitAit (94)
Dµ = gujt − H˜(ji)tM˜−1it [guit +BTit qˆit] (95)
D∗µ = H(ujxi)tAitx¯it−1 +H(ujxj)tAjtx¯jt−1
− H˜(ji)tM˜−1it
[
H(uixi)tAitx¯it−1 +H(uixj)tAjtx¯jt−1
]
(96)
Dχ = gˆjt + vˆjt − Qˆ(ji)tBitM˜−1it [g˜it +BTit qˆit] (97)
D∗χ = −Qˆ(ji)tBitM˜−1it
[
H(uixi)tAitx¯it−1
+H(uixj)tAjtx¯jt−1
]
(98)
µ∗it, D
∗
µ and D
∗
χ are correction terms due to the mixing of
states and actions in the reward function.
In the next step, we collect all the x¯kt−1 terms to reconstruct
the value function at t. In order to do so we need to consider
the state dependency of µ which did not play any role so far
as it depends only on the states at t− 1 and not t.
µjt = νjt + Πjtx¯it−1 + Ωjtx¯jt−1 (99)
−1
2
µ∗Tit M˜itµ
∗
it − µ¯TitM˜itµ∗it =
− x¯Tit−1ATitHxiuiM˜−1it
(
guit +B
T
it qˆit
)
− x¯Tjt−1ATjtHxjuiM˜−1it
(
guit +B
T
it qˆit
)
− x¯Tit−1ATitQˆitBitM˜−1it HuixiAitx¯it−1
− x¯Tjt−1ATjtHxjuiM˜−1it BTitQˆitAitx¯it−1
− x¯Tjt−1ATjtHxjuiM˜−1it HuixiAitx¯it−1
− 1
2
x¯Tjt−1A
T
jtHxjuiM˜
−1
it HuixjAjtx¯jt−1
− 1
2
x¯Tit−1A
T
itHxiuiM˜
−1
it HuixiAitx¯it−1 (100)
1
2
χTjtDχχχjt =
1
2
x¯Tjt−1(Ajt +BjtΩjt)
TDχχ(Ajt +BjtΩjt)x¯jt−1
+
1
2
x¯Tit−1Π
T
jtB
T
jtDχχBjtΠjtx¯it−1
+ x¯Tjt−1(Ajt +BjtΩjt)
TDχχBjtΠjtx¯it−1
+ x¯Tjt−1(Ajt +BjtΩjt)
TDχχBjtνjt
+ x¯Tit−1Π
T
jtB
T
jtDχχBjtνjt + const
(101)
1
2
µTjtDµµµjt =
1
2
x¯Tjt−1Ω
T
jtDµµΩjtx¯jt−1
+
1
2
x¯Tit−1Π
T
jtDµµΠjtx¯it−1
+ x¯Tjt−1Ω
T
jtDµµΠjtx¯it−1
+ x¯Tjt−1Ω
T
jtDµµνjt
+ x¯Tit−1Π
T
jtDµµνjt + const (102)
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µTjtDµχχjt =
[
x¯Tjt−1A
T
jtD
T
µχνjt
+ x¯Tjt−1A
T
jtD
T
µχΠjtx¯it−1
+ x¯Tjt−1A
T
jtD
T
µχΩjtx¯jt−1
]
+
[
x¯Tjt−1Ω
T
jt(DµχBjt)Ωjtx¯jt−1
+ x¯Tit−1Π
T
jt(DµχBjt)Πjtx¯it−1
+ x¯Tjt−1Ω
T
jt(DµχBjt +B
T
jtD
T
µχ)Πjtx¯it−1
+ x¯Tjt−1Ω
T
jt(DµχBjt +B
T
jtD
T
µχ)νjt
+ x¯Tit−1Π
T
jt(DµχBjt +B
T
jtD
T
µχ)νjt
]
+ const
(103)
µTjtDµxx¯it−1 =x¯
T
it−1D
T
µxνjt + x¯
T
it−1D
T
µxΠjtx¯it−1
+ x¯Tjt−1Ω
T
jtDµxx¯it−1 (104)
χTjtDχxx¯it−1 = x¯
T
jt−1A
T
jtDχxx¯it−1
+ x¯Tit−1(D
T
χxBjt)νjt
+ x¯Tit−1(D
T
χxBjt)Πjtx¯it−1
+ x¯Tjt−1Ω
T
jt(B
T
jtDχx)x¯it−1 (105)
µTjtDµ =x¯
T
it−1Π
T
jtDµ + x¯
T
jt−1Ω
T
jtDµ + const
(106)
χTjtDχ =x¯
T
jt−1A
T
jtDχ
+ x¯Tit−1Π
T
jt(B
T
jtDχ) + x¯
T
jt−1Ω
T
jt(B
T
jtDχ)
+ const (107)
µTjtD
∗
µ = x¯
T
it−1A
T
it
(
Hxiuj −HxiuiM˜−1it H˜(ij)t
)
νjt
+ x¯Tjt−1A
T
jt
(
Hxjuj −HxjuiM˜−1it H˜(ij)t
)
νjt
+ x¯Tit−1Π
T
jt
(
Hujxi − H˜(ji)tM˜−1it Huixi
)
Aitx¯it−1
+ x¯Tit−1Π
T
jt
(
Hujxj − H˜(ji)tM˜−1it Huixj
)
Ajtx¯jt−1
+ x¯Tjt−1Ω
T
jt
(
Hujxj − H˜(ji)tM˜−1it Huixj
)
Ajtx¯jt−1
+ x¯jt−1TΩTjt
(
Hujxi − H˜(ji)tM˜−1it Huixi
)
Aitx¯it−1
(108)
χTjtD
∗
χ = −x¯Tit−1ATitHxiuiM˜−1it BTitQˆ(ij)tBjtνjt
− x¯Tjt−1ATjtHxjuiM˜−1it BTitQˆ(ij)tBjtνjt
− x¯Tit−1ΠTjtBTjtQˆ(ji)tBitM˜−1it HuixiAitx¯it−1
− x¯Tit−1ΠTjtBTjtQˆ(ji)tBitM˜−1it HuixjAjtx¯jt−1
− x¯Tjt−1
(
Ajt +BjtΩjt
)T
Qˆ(ji)tBitM˜
−1
it HuixjAjtx¯jt−1
− x¯Tjt−1
(
Ajt +BjtΩjt
)T
Qˆ(ji)tBitM˜
−1
it HuixiAitx¯it−1
(109)
Colours indicate which agent the states belong to. Now,
we collect the terms and also make use of the single agent
solution provided by (Levine & Koltun, 2012) for reward
functions where states and actions do not mix.
First, we collect the terms that resemble the following ex-
pression.
1
2
x¯Tnt−1Vˆ(nn)t−1x¯nt−1 (110)
Vˆ(ii)t−1 =ΠTjt
[
M˜jt − M˜(ji)tM˜−1it M˜(ij)t]Πjt+[
ATitQˆ
∗
(ij)t −ATitQˆ∗itM˜−1it M˜(ij)t
]
Πjt+
ΠTjt
[
ATitQˆ
∗
(ij)t −ATitQˆ∗itM˜−1it M˜(ij)t
]T
+ATitQˆitAit−ATitQˆ∗itM˜−1it Qˆ†itAit (111)
With
M˜(nm)t = B
T
ntQˆ(nm)tBmt + H˜(nm)t (112)
Qˆ∗(nm)t = Hxnum + Qˆ(nm)tBmt (113)
Qˆ†(mn)t = Humxn +B
T
mtQˆ(mn)t (114)
Blue indicates the single agent solution.
Vˆ(jj)t−1 =ΩTjt
[
M˜jt − M˜(ji)tM˜−1it M˜(ij)t
]
Ωjt+[
ATjtQˆ
∗
(jj)t −ATjtQˆ∗(ji)tM˜−1it M˜(ij)t
]
Ωjt+
ΩTjt
[
ATjtQˆ
∗
(jj)t −ATjtQˆ∗(ji)tM˜−1it M˜(ij)t
]T
+
ATjtQˆ(jj)tAjt −ATjtQˆ∗(ji)tM˜−1it Qˆ†(ij)tAjt
(115)
The structure of the equation closely mirrors that of Vˆ(ii)t.
Next, we collect the following terms.
x¯Tnt−1Vˆ(nm)t−1x¯mt−1 (116)
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Vˆ(ji)t−1 =ΩTjt
[
M˜jt − M˜(ji)tM˜−1it M˜(ij)t
]
Πjt+
ΩTjt
[
ATitQˆ
∗
(ij)t −ATitQˆ∗itM˜−1it M˜(ij)t
]T
+[
ATjtQˆ
∗
(jj)t −ATjtQˆ∗(ji)tM˜−1it M˜(ij)t
]
Πjt+
ATjtQˆ(ji)tAit −ATjtQˆ∗(ji)tM˜−1it Qˆ†(ii)tAit
(117)
And finally, we collect the terms that resemble the following
expression.
x¯Tnt−1vˆnt−1 (118)
vˆjt−1 = ΩTjt
[
M˜jt − M˜(ji)tM˜−1it M˜(ij)t
]
νjt
+
[
ATjtQˆ
∗
(jj)t −ATjtQˆ∗(ji)tM˜−1it M˜(ij)t
]
νjt
+ ΩTjt
(
g˜jt +B
T
jtqˆjt − M˜(ji)tM˜−1it
[
g˜it +B
T
it qˆit
])
+ATjtqˆjt −ATjtQˆ∗(ji)tM˜−1it [g˜it +BTit qˆit] (119)
vˆit−1 = ΠTjt
[
M˜jt − M˜(ji)tM˜−1it M˜(ij)t
]
νjt
+
[
ATitQˆ
∗
(ij)t −ATitQˆ∗(ii)tM˜−1it M˜(ij)t
]
νjt
+ ΠTjt
(
g˜jt +B
T
jtqˆjt − M˜(ji)tM˜−1it
[
g˜it +B
T
it qˆit
])
+ATitqˆit−ATitQˆ∗(ii)tM˜−1it
[
g˜it +B
T
it qˆit
]
(120)
Again, blue indicates the single agent solution.
COMMENT ON EXTENSION TO N
AGENTS
We may define an N-agent extension of the soft-Bellman
equation that reflects the two-agent case discussed in the
main paper.
Qi(xt−1, uit) =∫
p(xt|xt−1, u1t, ..., uNt)ΠNk=1pik(ukt|xt−1)(
ri(xt, u1t, ..., uNt)
+ γ log
∫
exp(Qi(xt, uit+1))duit+1
)
dujtdxt (121)
The environment transitions p(xt|xt−1, u1t, ..., uNt) will
be deterministic again. Approximating the reward function
by a second-order Taylor expansion in the states and actions
r(x¯1t, ..., x¯Nt, u¯1t, ..., u¯Nt) ≈
rt +

x¯1t
...
x¯Nt
u¯1t
...
u¯Nt

T
Ht

x¯1t
...
x¯Nt
u¯1t
...
u¯Nt
+

x¯1t
...
x¯Nt
u¯1t
...
u¯Nt

T
gt (122)
will make the integral in (121) tractable. Again, the policies
of the other agents will reduce to Gaussian distributions.
As with the two-agent case, the resulting Q-function will
be quadratic in the actions u¯it. Thus, we will be able to
determine the value function analytically as well given the
integral Vit = log
∫
exp(Qit(u¯it))du¯it. In other words, the
overall derivation will resemble that of the two-agent case.
Though new value recursion matrices and equations will ap-
pear, namely, Vˆnmt matrices that describe the interaction of
other agents. Given multiple counterparts agent i also needs
to consider how other agents react to each other, increasing
the complexity of the value recursion formulas. We leave
the derivation and empirical verification of the N-agent case
for future work.
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